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Summary 
A number of studies on political representation focus on the comparative as-
sessments of citizen ideological congruence. But this literature has largely 
overlooked an important topic: the representation of social groups. While pre-
sent studies of congruence investigate whether some countries perform better 
than others in terms of the levels of median citizen congruence, they cannot 
say much about the extent to which political elites give adequate concern to 
every group of citizens in the representative process. In this paper I intro-
duce the concept and measure of inequality in congruence and demonstrate its 
properties by comparing gender groups. I also ask whether virtues of propor-
tional electoral arrangements endure when we consider group differences in 
ideological representation. Empirical tests that were conducted on data from 
88 legislative elections in 33 countries strongly suggest that gender inequal-
ity in congruence is in fact considerably smaller in countries with majorita-
rian arrangements. 
Keywords: Inequality in Congruence, Gender Gap, Electoral Rules, Represen-
tation, Comparative Politics
Over the last twenty years, a number of comparative studies on political representa-
tion have analyzed whether democratic systems fulfill their most important role: to 
enable citizens to influence policies. Democracies where the preferences of citizens 
correspond to the positions of political parties, median legislators or governments 
come closer to the ideals of good representation (Blais and Bodet 2006; Golder 
and Stramski 2010; Huber and Powell 1994; Kim et al. 2010; Powell and Vanberg 
2000; Powell 2000, 2009, 2013). Empirically, the degree of ideological or prefer-
ence agreement between representatives and citizenry is conceptualized and mea-
sured as “congruence” or “correspondence”. A tacit assumption behind this strand 
of literature is that the positions of representatives should be a strong signal of their 
future policy-making and therefore a good measure of democratic performance. 
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Consequently, most of these studies also ask whether the relationship between con-
gruence and political institutions exists. Among the institutions analyzed, most em-
phasis is placed on the differences between two main types of electoral systems, 
those which use proportional and majoritarian rules.
Findings suggest that ideological congruence is higher in proportional systems. 
Agreement over the merits of proportional rules for congruence, however, is limited 
only to the congruence between citizens and their parliaments. With respect to con-
gruence at the government level the findings are still largely inconsistent, and often 
referred to as the ideological congruence controversy. The debate over the congru-
ence at the government level has revealed that, until recently, much of this litera-
ture has not considered alternative ways to conceptualize and measure congruence. 
Golder and Stramski (2010) have partly filled this gap by suggesting different ope-
rationalizations of congruence and more appropriate measures. But, as this study 
will demonstrate, even in their careful examination of all possible conceptualiza-
tions of congruence, an important dimension is still largely unexplored – equality 
in congruence. 
Virtually all congruence studies use the central tendency in mass opinion, me-
dian position, as a benchmark of representation. Such practice largely builds on 
the social choice theory and the widespread acceptance of the median citizen1 as 
the most appropriate representation of a diversity of citizen opinions. Congruence 
literature argues that, while the median position does not actually capture the di-
versity of citizen opinions, it is the only position that minimizes the distance be-
tween all citizens (Dalton et al. 2011; Huber and Powell 1994). If the final result 
of policy-making is indeed influenced by citizens’ preferences, than it should most 
closely match the position of a median citizen, since it is unrealistic to expect that 
enacted policies will incorporate the ‘diversity’ of all citizens’ opinions (also see 
Cox 1997). However, by focusing on the median, we ignore an important aspect 
of political representation: the representation of politically relevant groups. Huber 
and Powell, who pioneered the comparative representation studies, also acknow-
ledge this shortcoming and note that “to recognize the importance of majority posi-
tions in democratic theory is, of course, not to deny that taking account of intense 
minorities is an important theoretical and practical problem for democracy” (1994: 
293). This leads to a serious problem: while studies of congruence might discover 
that some countries perform better than others in terms of the levels of aggregate 
1 It has to be noted here that terms such as median voters or median citizens are used inter-
changeably, without any reference to the normative justification of the selected measures (Po-
well 2000). As several studies show, the difference can be meaningful, since representatives of-
ten selectively respond only to those citizens who are electorally active or more affluent (Bartels 
2005, 2010; Gilens 2005, 2012; Griffin et al. 2012; Griffin and Newman 2005, 2007).
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representation, they cannot determine whether some democratic practices are fairer 
than others. 
Why should we care about the ‘fairness’ of representation? One only needs 
to recall Mill who pointed out that every citizen should be “fully privileged as any 
other” (Mill 1972 [1861]: 313), or the more recent lesson on democratic theory from 
Verba who argued that in every democracy “elected officials should give equal con-
siderations to the needs and preferences of all citizens” (2003: 1). The analysis of 
the quality of political representation is imperfect without the analysis of its equal-
ity – the extent to which political elites give adequate concern to every citizen and 
every group of citizens in the representative process. This old idea has been given 
substantial consideration in studies of group representation. Many scholars address 
the representation of income, race or gender groups on various stages of representa-
tion (see for instance Bartels 2005, 2010 and Gilens 2005, 2012, or recent study in 
European countries by Adams and Ezrow 2009). Such studies include, but are not 
limited to, analysis of female descriptive representation, representation of racial mi-
norities through legislative behavior, representation of different income groups in 
terms of actual political commitments such as budgetary spending or elite respon-
siveness towards particular groups of citizens who are better-equipped to voice their 
concerns in the representative process. 
Building on the literature on equality in political influence this analysis widens 
the grasp of congruence studies by asking to which extent representative democra-
cies fulfill the criterion of political equality, measured as the difference in legislative 
and government congruence between men and women across countries. I will first 
introduce the measure of inequality in group congruence by adapting the measure 
of relative congruence introduced by Golder and Stramski (2010). The new mea-
sure, calculated from available modules of the Comparative Study of Electoral Sys-
tems (henceforth CSES) and the most recent European Elections Study (henceforth 
EES), is then applied to analyze gender differences in ideological congruence. In 
line with standard practice this study also assumes that the policy preferences, es-
pecially the ideological positions, of average legislators as well as the government 
should be a decent proxy for the expected policy outcome. If elections and subse-
quent government formation mechanisms do not produce equal preference repre-
sentation of gender groups, it is likely that political decisions and actual policy 
outcomes might reflect that bias. Although one could study inequality in congru-
ence for various subgroups of the population, the existence of gender bias in other 
dimensions of political representation has steered the focus on gender equality in 
this paper. Also, the abundance of empirical research on gender difference facili-
tates the development of theoretical expectations and can be used to validate new 
findings. 
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Not only that, the analysis of a broad sample of parliamentary democracies 
enables me to study the role of different political institutions. Congruence has a dif-
ferent meaning depending on the underlying theory of democracy we apply. This is 
especially evident when we consider differences between two visions of democracy 
that define modern electoral systems: proportional and majoritarian. From a majori-
tarian standpoint, congruence of a median citizen position is certainly an appropri-
ate normative and empirical standard for assessing the performance of democracies. 
However, if proportional rules help in establishing a fair reflection of voter prefer-
ences and policies responsive to as many people as possible, the median standard 
should not be the only criterion for the comparison of the quality of representation. 
As Powell notes, “the normative status of the median voter in the proportional vi-
sion depends on our accepting the principle that in the final decision majorities 
should have more influence than minorities...” (2000: 165). Median correspondence 
is a rather unfair standard to impose on countries with proportional systems. Hence, 
influenced by current research on comparative ideological congruence, namely in-
vestigations on the moderating impact of electoral rules on citizen-elite congruence, 
I also re-evaluate the claim about the virtues of proportional representation given an 
additional criterion: equality in gender congruence.
Concept and Measure of Inequality in Congruence
The basic premise of existing studies on the representation of social groups is that 
a group of citizens shares needs and desires which should in turn be equally repre-
sented in the policy-making process (Sapiro 1981; Verba et al. 1995). If a selected 
group does not have unique politically relevant characteristics, then this group’s 
correspondence with representatives would be as good or as bad as the median 
congruence. In other words, if females hold the same preferences and interests as 
males, there cannot be inequality in gender representation, given that the distance 
of males and females from representatives would be equal. However, there is suf-
ficient evidence to expect that women and men have different preferences and that 
they are, at least on a set of relevant issues, indeed distinguishable. Many authors 
have reported a notable left shift in female preferences (Inglehart and Norris 2000; 
Jelen et al. 1994; Pratto et al. 1997). Women are found to share more positive atti-
tudes towards the welfare state and redistribution. Moreover, many studies repeat-
edly show that men and women differ with regards to all dimensions of political 
life; whether it is vote choice, ideological self-placement or levels of political par-
ticipation.
In the empirical analysis that follows, I construct the measures of gender con-
gruence as congruence in ideological positions. The left-right dimension, as the 
main denomination of the ideological position in contemporary politics, is consi-
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dered as an abstract measure that incorporates all the relevant issues on which vot-
ers and parties could take a stand. Citizens can use the left-right continuum as an 
instrument that serves as a general reference point without the need to understand 
each policy in detail. Dalton and colleagues note that the reason the left-right place-
ment is so valuable in empirical research is its inclusiveness; it is a “simple struc-
ture” that can “summarize the political positions of voters and other political ac-
tors” (2011: 85). Besides, although it might be considered an oversimplification of 
the multidimensional issue space, such oversimplification can only lead to a more 
“conservative estimate of the actual working of the party linkage in electoral poli-
tics” (ibid.: 86). 
In the surveys conducted by CSES and EES the respondents were asked to 
place themselves on the left-right scale and also to place a number of the most re-
levant parties in their country on the same left-right scale. The ideological posi-
tions of legislatures and governments are obtained from the respondents’ estimates 
of the ideological positions of parties in the legislature and parties in government 
at the time of the closest elections. The literature suggests that the uninformed re-
spondents tend to place parties for which they do not have enough information on 
the middle point in the scale, so the solution is to use answers of those respondents 
who are more likely to be familiar with the parties’ true position (Dalton et al. 2011; 
Golder and Stramski 2010). I have calculated the mean placement of each party as 
reported by the respondents with the highest levels of education in the survey. Reli-
ance on citizens’ perceptions should also reduce the error associated with differen-
tial item functioning, since both citizen and elite positions were calculated from the 
same source, and both estimates are linked to the same point in time. Even if these 
party positions are not the true positions, they are still a good indicator of where the 
respondents, on average, place those parties and how those same respondents per-
ceive the ideological space in their country (Golder and Stramski 2010). 
The average ideological position of the legislature is calculated as the mean 
position of all parties in the legislature weighted by each party’s share in the total 
number of seats. In some cases, the party positions could not have been calculated 
from the respondents’ placements because that particular party was not mentioned 
in the survey. If the information on the ideological placement was missing for more 
than 6% of the total seats in the parliament, the country was eliminated from the 
analysis for the given year. The ideological position of the government, similarly to 
the average parliament position, was calculated as the weighted average of left-right 
positions of all the parties in the government. If only one party was in government, 
the ideological position of the government was equal to the ideological position of 
that party. 
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The most common measure of congruence between citizens and policy-makers 
is the simple absolute ideological distance between the median citizen and the mean 
or median position of the legislature or government. This measure, however, is not 
sensitive to the actual distribution of citizens’ preferences. To avoid this problem, 
Golder and Stramski suggest an alternative approach, a measure of relative citizen 
congruence (2010). The measure of relative congruence takes into consideration 
both the absolute distance between all citizens and their representatives and the 
actual dispersion of the citizens’ preferences in the given sample. This measure is 
calculated as the sum of absolute distances between the left-right positions of the 
members of a constituency (Ci x) and the most preferred position of the constitu-
ency, that of the median citizen (Cx), divided by the sum of absolute differences be-
tween the left-right mean positions of all the members of the empirical constituency 
(Ci x) and the average ideological position of the legislative (Lx) or government 
(Gx). I preferred this measure as it allows me to capture the ideological congruence 
of selected groups by using the positions of the members of the sub-constituency2 
(Subi x) and the most preferred position of the sub-constituency (Subx). Taking into 
consideration that ideological congruence can be different if we measure the posi-
tions of the representatives in parliament or in government, I will estimate measures 
of relative congruence for both levels of representation:
Relative Sub-constituency Legislative Congruence (RSLC):
 (1)
Relative Sub-constituency Governmental Congruence (RSGC):
 (2)
The measure of relative congruence goes from 0 to 1. Zero values indicate per-
fect congruence, where congruence is high because the absolute distance between 
the sub-constituents and their legislative or government is small relative to the dis-
persion of the preferences of sub-constituents. Low congruence occurs when the 
absolute distance between the groups and their legislative or government is large 
compared to the dispersion of the group preferences. 
The left plot in Figure 1 on the next page shows the differences in left-right 
positioning between male and female respondents across all the selected countries. 
For clarity, the figure shows the average positions for both groups only for the first 
module of CSES. In most cases female respondents tend to place themselves more 
towards the left end of the scale than male respondents, as was also predicted by 
2 The term sub-constituency is adopted from Adams and Ezrow (2009).
1 –  Σi
N
– 1 | Subix – Subx
       ΣiN– 1 | Subix – Lx
1 –  Σi
N
– 1 | Subix – Subx
       ΣiN– 1 | Subix – Gx
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Figure 1. Ideological Self-placement and Relative Group Congruence for Men 
and Women Calculated for Countries in CSES Module 1
Note: In the left figure horizontal lines represent standard error values associated with each mean 












































































the recent gender gap theory (Inglehart and Norris 2000; Jelen et al. 1994; Pratto et 
al. 1997). There are also many countries in which there are no distinguishable dif-
ferences in preferences between genders, as in Romania or the Czech Republic in 
1996. However, even if the differences between males and females are not large, it 
is still possible that these groups are not equally represented. The letter ‘R’ in the 
plot shows the weighted average position of all parties in the parliament for the 
closest elections. The case of Belgium in 1999 illustrates this point, with no large 
gender differences in ideological positions, but while having men slightly closer to 
the parliament’s position than females. 
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The right side of Figure 1 shows the levels of relative citizen congruence for 
each group. It is apparent that in most cases women have lower levels of congruence 
compared to men. It is important to mention yet again that both figures show only 
a subset of the cases that will be analyzed later. The distance of each group in rela-
tion to the position of the parliament will also depend on the group’s preference dis-
tribution. If for some reason left-right placement is more dispersed among women 
than among men, the congruence measure will capture this difference and the levels 
of congruence might be lower for women. Another comparison demonstrates this 
properly. In Poland and Romania, both genders have zero values on relative legisla-
tive congruence which indicates perfect congruence. This result is unexpected for 
Poland given the differences in relation to representatives and gender as seen in the 
figure on the left; however, in Poland both groups have more dispersed preferences 
than in Romania. As Golder and Stramski explain, if two countries have the same 
values of median citizen left-right and representative positioning, the difference in 
the levels of relative citizen congruence might depend on the citizens’ dispersion of 
preferences (2010). By adapting their measure for group congruence I also control 
for differences in dispersion of preferences between groups and between countries.
Consider the six hypothetical examples in Figure 2. To simplify the illustration, 
in the examples the distribution of group preferences is equal. In country A the posi-
tion of the representatives on the left-right scale is 5. In the first example (a) women 
and men are equally congruent with their representatives. In the second and third 
example (b and c) one group is more congruent than the other indicating inequality 
in ideological representation. In country B the situation is slightly different since 
the position of the representatives is further away from both groups in all instances 
Figure 2. Gender Inequalities in Congruence, Averaged by Country
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compared to that of country A. The first example (d) illustrates a situation where 
both women and men are quite distant from their representatives’ position, but they 
are equally distant. The other two examples (e and f) show situations where one or 
the other group is closer to that of the representatives, but they are both less congru-
ent than the groups in country A.
The measure of relative congruence for each group provides information about 
the level of representation for gender groups and countries. However, this study 
further investigates the fairness of representative democracies, so it is important to 
determine to which extent the relative congruence of women differs from that of 
their male counterparts (formulas 3 and 4). If there is no difference in the congru-
ence of males and females, they are equally represented. Also, as the illustrations 
show, an equality measure is not sensitive to the levels of congruence. The estimates 
of congruence inequality for the example pairs a-b, b-e or c-f would be exactly the 
same. In country A their levels of congruence are equally good and in country B 
equally bad. 
Inequality in Legislative and Government Congruence:
ILCgender = RSLCfemale – RSLCmale (3)
IGCgender = RSGCfemale – RSGCmale (4)
Figure 3 shows the difference in congruence levels (ILC and IGC) between 
groups for a sub-sample of countries from CSES and EES. Since the measure re-
presents a simple difference between groups, as the formulas above demonstrate, 
the sign of the value indicates which group is closer to the parliament and to the 
government’s position. The ideological congruence of women is subtracted from 
the ideological congruence of men, so the positive values indicate that women’s 
preferences are further from the average parliamentary position than are those of 
men. Females are generally less congruent compared to men; however, there are 
several countries, such as Luxembourg or Greece, where the direction of inequality 
indicates bias for male respondents.
In Figure 3 the letter ‘M’ marks the levels of relative citizen congruence, the 
original measure used by Golder and Stramski (2010). Levels of inequality in re-
presentation are not always higher in countries where the average citizen is further 
away from the ideological position of the parliament. In Austria, the relative citizen 
congruence is very low, but at the same time the congruence differences between 
gender groups are very small, indicating high levels of gender equality. Hypotheti-
cally, it is possible to differentiate between various clusters of countries: countries 
with high median citizen congruence and low or high inequality, and countries with 
low median citizen congruence and low or high inequality. Ideally, high quality 
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representative democracies, at least in terms of gender ideological differences, 
would have high levels of median citizen congruence and low levels of inequal-
ity. The example of Norway perfectly captures the missing dimension in previous 
studies of ideological congruence. While the median citizen congruence in Norway 
is satisfactory, the gender gap is very large. If we compared men and women on 
specific policy issues on which differences might be more pronounced, the gaps in 
ideological congruence would be even higher. 
Another difference between the standard measure of congruence and inequal-
ity in congruence is visible in Figure 3. The average position of the government 
varies more substantively across the ideological scale compared with that of the 
Figure 3. Gender Inequalities in Congruence, Averaged by Country
Note: M refers to the position of the representative (weighted average of all parties in the parlia-
ment and in government). Presented values are average inequality in legislative congruence and 
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parliament, so larger gaps in the relative median citizen congruence (M) are present 
in most of the countries. However, the gap between genders does not significantly 
increase when we move from the parliamentary representation to the group dis-
tance from governments. What is noticeable is that the direction of inequality might 
change. In Malta there are no differences between genders given legislative con-
gruence, but in terms of government congruence females seem to be better off than 
male citizens. In Croatia we see the opposite: while both inequality in congruence 
and relative citizen congruence are perfect at the legislative stage, female inequality 
is quite prominent at the governmental level. 
Electoral Rules and Gender Gap in Congruence 
An explanation for the differences in congruence inequality between gender groups 
might be related to the existence of different electoral systems, or more broadly to 
the choice between proportional and majoritarian visions of democracy. Electoral 
systems determine the context in which citizens, candidates and parties interact and 
serve as a main mechanism through which citizens’ preferences are translated into 
policies. Any sort of distortions in congruence and cross-country variation in con-
gruence, regardless of the way we empirically measure the constituencies, should at 
least partly depend on the constellations of electoral systems in liberal democracies 
(Ezrow 2010). There are strong theoretical arguments why both the majoritarian 
and the proportional electoral systems might enhance citizen-elite correspondence, 
particularly the median voter proximity to parliaments and governments (Blais and 
Bodet 2006; Golder and Stramski 2010; Huber and Powell 1994; Kim et al. 2010; 
Powell and Vanberg 2000; Powell 2000, 2009, 2013). 
Predictions from Duverger’s theory (1963) and spatial theories of party com-
petition (Downs 1957; Cox 1990) suggest that majoritarian and proportional demo-
cracies can both, under specific conditions, produce high citizen-elite congruence. 
If there are two competing parties in the elections that win most seats, as Downs 
median voter theorem implies, the party with legislative majority should be very 
close to the median voter. In PR systems, with multiple parties dividing seats in 
parliament, it is very likely that at least one of the parties will be located close to 
the median voter position (Golder and Lloyd 2014). So far the findings suggest 
that conditions required to produce higher legislative congruence are less stringent 
in proportional systems than those required in majoritarian systems (Golder and 
Stramski 2010; Huber and Powell 1994; Powell 2000; Powell and Vanberg 2000). 
Majoritarian electoral rules, contrary to theoretical advantage, in practice do not 
consistently produce parties at the median position.
On the other hand, empirical research on the mediating effect of electoral rules 
on government congruence has been largely inconclusive. The expected mecha-
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nisms do not necessarily work in the way suggested by theory. One group of re-
searchers finds that the countries that employ proportional representation electoral 
rules fare much better at government ideological congruence than majoritarian de-
mocracies (Huber and Powell 1994; Powell and Vanberg 2000). More recent re-
search, however, offers compelling evidence that the previous findings might be 
erroneous (Blais and Bodet 2006; Golder and Stramski 2010), suggesting that there 
is no evidence to conclude that the median citizen congruence is better or worse in 
countries that apply majoritarian arrangements. The main problem in the assessment 
of the impact of electoral rules on government representation revolves around the 
complexity of causal mechanisms connecting legislative and government forma-
tion. In majoritarian systems the causal chain is straightforward, “the position of the 
government is likely to be the same as that of the median legislative party” and, as 
a consequence, “there should be no change in either the level or variability of ideo-
logical congruence as one moves from the legislative to the governmental level” 
(Golder and Lloyd 2014: 207). In contrast, a median or plurality party can often be 
included in coalitions formed in proportional systems, but whether this happens or 
not will ultimately depend on the decisions of elites.
New findings from Powell (2009) and Golder and Lloyd (2014) offer some 
evidence to resolve this “ideological congruence controversy”. Powell argues that 
the different results can be an artifact of the different time frame which was used 
in newer studies (2009). Even though the advantage of proportional systems disap-
pears in the period from 1996 to 2004, Powell goes on to say that this is simply an 
anomaly and that PR systems do produce greater government ideological congru-
ence in general (2009). Furthermore, he suggests that the competing results pre-
sented by other authors might have something to do with the greater variability in 
government congruence in majoritarian systems compared to PR systems. Golder 
and Lloyd follow up on this claim and find no evidence to support it; their analysis 
indicates that PR systems exhibit greater variability at the governmental level, but 
the results still do not support the claim that PR systems also outperform majoritar-
ian systems at the governmental level (2014). 
A descriptive analysis of gender congruence demonstrates that the consider-
able country differences exist both in terms of the levels of inequality and the di-
rection of inequality. Given previous findings on the relationship between electoral 
rules and median correspondence it is logical to ask whether chosen electoral sys-
tem mechanisms moderate inequalities among subgroups of the population. Since 
the distinction between the two visions is often presented in terms of tradeoffs be-
tween the accurate representation of diverse preferences and government account-
ability, theoretically proportional systems should reduce gender differences in con-
gruence. Advocates of proportional systems, most notably Lijphart, argued that “the 
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beauty of PR is that, in addition to producing proportionality and minority represen-
tation, it treats all groups – ethnic, racial, religious, or even noncommunal groups – 
in a completely equal and evenhanded fashion” (2004: 100). Although some might 
argue that this idea of proportionality should not be extended to gender groups, as 
they are not ethnic or religious minorities, Lijphart himself notes that women’s re-
presentation can “serve as an indirect proxy of how well minorities are represented 
generally” (2012: 280).
It should be noted that the impact of the electoral systems can also be largely 
dependent on the distributions of group preferences across policy space. If women 
have more leftist preferences their congruence will be better in countries where 
parliaments and governments include more leftist parties. Elections in majoritarian 
systems result in parliaments and governments where ideology is “off-set consider-
ably to the left or to the right of the median voter” and thereby resulting in higher 
women congruence than in countries with proportional rules (Carey and Hix 2009). 
Also, a party system can shape the views of citizens so public preferences are not 
always exogenous to party system offerings. In majoritarian systems voters’ prefer-
ences can be expected to be more homogeneous than they would be if they lived in 
countries with proportional arrangements (Downs 1957). As a consequence, group 
differences in ideological positions might be rather small in systems with a smaller 
number of parties simply because of the supply side of the process. 
Moreover, while majoritarian election results might be unfair for certain groups 
at the legislative formation stage, proportional systems always involve a great deal 
of uncertainty over the government formation. Inequality in preference aggrega-
tion in majoritarian systems will be visible right after elections, while additional 
sources of subversion for proportional systems might occur during the government 
formation. For instance, if inequality in congruence is lower in PR systems at the 
legislative stage, beneficial impacts of proportionality can easily be cancelled at 
higher stages of the representative process. Given different findings in previous lite-
rature and different causal pathways through which electoral rules might influence 
the outcomes, it remains to be tested whether gender inequality in representation is 
lower in countries with proportional electoral arrangements than in countries that 
apply majoritarian electoral rules. I now turn to examine this question empirically. 
The above-mentioned hypotheses are tested on 88 elections, with a focus on 
parliamentary democracies only. To measure the differences in electoral systems I 
use Gallagher’s continuous measure of disproportionality rather than a simple major-
itarian-proportional binary measure, approach as suggested by Golder and Stramski 
(2010). The least squares index ranges from 1 to 100 where higher numbers indicate 
greater difference in the percentage of votes and seats obtained by parliamentary par-
ties in each country. As an illustration, the lowest disproportionality is in Denmark, 
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which uses a highly proportional Hare plus largest remainders formula, while the 
highest is in the countries that use plurality or majority formulas such as France in 
2002 and Great Britain in 2009. As an additional test, models also include average 
district magnitude as an alternative indicator for the type of electoral system. 
To ease interpretation, the measures of inequality in representation, presented 
in formulas 3 and 4, are taken as the absolute differences between the relative ideo-
logical positions of females compared to males. Several models with robust stand-
ard errors clustered by country are estimated, as shown in Table 1. In all models, I 
control for the overall levels of relative median congruence, since in those countries 
where the average citizen is poorly represented it is also most likely that group in-
equality will be higher. The results support that expectation for both stages of re-
presentation. 
Table 1. Electoral Rules and Gender Inequality in Congruence
 Parliament  Government  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Disproportionality -0.04** (0.22)  -0.03** (0.01)  
Average district 




(0.09) 0.14* (0.07) 0.09*** (0.02) 0.08*** (0.02)
Inequality in legislative 
congruence   0.81*** (0.11) 0.84*** (0.12)
N 88 88 88 88
R squared 0.10 0.13 0.57 0.57
Note: *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, two-tailed test. The table reports estimated coefficients and 
robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by country. The dependent variable is the in-
equality in congruence (0-1). The definitions of the independent variables are given in the text; 
all variables are recoded on a scale from 0 to 1. The results are also robust for bootstrap re-sam-
pling schemes.
In the case when inequality in congruence is calculated for gender distances 
from the government I also control for the levels of inequality at a lower stage. If par-
liament – government stages are closely linked, we should also expect a significant 
spill-over effect of inequality created during interest aggregation in legislature onto 
the higher stage. Furthermore, since gender inequality is more likely to be higher in 
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countries where group preferences significantly differ, inequality in legislative con-
gruence should also capture that national-level difference. As expected, inequality in 
legislative congruence accounts for a large part of the variation in government con-
gruence. As normative theory suggests, representation is a process of interconnected 
stages, if there is distortion in the relationship between gender groups at the legisla-
tive stage, this distortion will be transferred to governmental representation. 
More relevant for my initial question, regarding the relationship between pro-
portionality and levels of inequality, the results imply that gender equality in con-
gruence is significantly higher in countries with disproportional electoral outcomes 
– majoritarian systems. Majoritarian systems outperform proportional systems 
given gender inequality levels in legislative and in government congruence. Note, 
however, that the findings are more robust for government congruence since the 
coefficients on the disproportionality index and average district magnitude both 
point to significant differences between electoral systems. Interestingly, the same 
rationale used to explain the lack of median correspondence in majoritarian systems 
might clarify these results. The conditions under which proportional systems induce 
good group representation are in empirical reality much less likely than mecha-
nisms through which majoritarian systems satisfy this specific dimension of gender 
equality. The very fact that majoritarian systems do not produce parliaments and 
governments close to the median position apparently closes the gap between wo-
men and men. Additional tests reveal that the differences in left-right self-place-
ment between genders are slightly more pronounced in proportional systems, with 
an average difference of 0.21 compared to 0.16 for majoritarian countries, which 
could party explain this finding. However, if it is true that party system character-
istics also have an impact on the differences in preferences between social groups, 
majoritarian systems will still rank better on the gender equality scale. 
Conclusion
Good correspondence between popular preferences and the positions of elected of-
ficials, enabled primarily by the electoral process, is the driving force of any repre-
sentative democracy. The success of democracy in any country should, therefore, be 
evaluated on the grounds of the quality of citizen-elite linkages. So far comparative 
studies have predominantly focused on the quality of those linkages by examining 
the distance between median citizens and their parliaments and governments. In this 
paper, I have argued that the quality of representation cannot be assessed merely on 
the grounds of the median citizen congruence. Studies that focus on median citizens 
might only discover that some countries perform better than others in terms of the 
degree of good correspondence, but they cannot say whether the elites give equal 
consideration to every citizen in the representative process. As a contribution to the 
present studies of comparative congruence, I have suggested a modification of the 
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measure of relative citizen congruence to study the differences of congruence be-
tween politically relevant groups. 
This measure is not only useful for comparing the congruence of groups with 
median correspondence but can also be used to gauge the level of group inequality. 
It would, also, be interesting to see whether gender equality in ideological congru-
ence, as one of the minimal conditions for substantive representation, is enhanced 
by legal and voluntary implementations of women’s quotas. Even more, one could 
ask to which extent is the increased number of women in parliaments related to a 
greater congruence of women with their country’s representative institutions. This 
is particularly important if we consider the fact that ideological congruence is only 
one dimension of representation. High congruence does not imply that the govern-
ment will actually act in the interest of its constituents, but if there is low congru-
ence, it is questionable whether policy outcomes will equally reflect the needs and 
desires of all relevant groups. 
In the second part of the paper, I analyzed whether the most frequent explana-
tion of variation in congruence, namely differences between majoritarian and pro-
portional systems, holds when we consider gender equality in representation. I find 
that the case for proportionality, at least one that emphasizes the inclusive features 
of this vision of democracy, is not strong. The results are more strongly in favor 
of government congruence – majoritarian systems outperform PR systems when 
it comes to gender equality at both stages of representation. Since much cannot 
change between two stages of a representative process in these countries, the bene-
fits of majoritarian arrangements for gender equality in congruence remain signifi-
cant across levels. This issue certainly warrants additional research and discussion. 
To a certain extent this paper echoes the conclusion reached by Golder and Stram-
ski, who argued that “empirical results about citizen-representative congruence can 
depend in many situations on exactly how we conceptualize congruence” (2010: 
104). I would just add that it also depends on who exactly do we regard, both nor-
matively and research worthy, as constituents.
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